Selected Publications

 

Books

 

 

Designation (1981)

 

Realism and Truth (1984/1991/1997)

Realism and Truth Index 1997
(The 1997 Princeton edition is the 1991 Blackwell 2nd edition together with a new Afterword.
Its index is a reprint of the 1991 index and so does not cover the Afterword.)

 

 

Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language (with Kim Sterelny) (1987/1999)

 

Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism (1996)

 

The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language (co-edited with Richard Hanley) (2006)

 

Ignorance of Language (2006)


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology (2010)
Also available on Amazon

 

 

 

 

 


Overlooking Conventions: The Trouble with Linguistic Pragmatism (2021)

 

 

 

 

 

 


Biological Essentialism (2023)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Papers

 

1.   Philosophy of Language

1.1 Meaning

Semantic Polysemy and Psycholinguistics (2021)

Three Mistakes about Semantic Intentions (2020)

A Methodological Flaw? A Reply to Korta and Perry. (2019)

Sub-sententials: Pragmatics or Semantics? (2018)

Unresponsive Bach (2013)

Good and Bad Bach (2013)

Three Methodological Flaws of Linguistic Pragmatism (2013)

What Makes a Property “Semantic”? (2013)

The Myth of the Problematic De Se (2013)

Is There a Place for Truth-Conditional Pragmatics (2013)

Still Against Direct Reference (2012)

Deference and the Use Theory (2011)

Meaning and Use (2002)

A Shocking Idea about Meaning (2001)

Precis of Coming to Our Senses (1997)

A Priori Convictions about Psychology (1997)

Meanings and Psychology: A Reply to Mark Richard (1997)

Responses to the Maribor Papers (1997)

The Methodology of Naturalistic Semantics (1994)

A Critique of the Case for Semantic Holism (1993)

Meanings Just Ain’t in the Head (1990)

On Removing Puzzles about Belief Ascription (1990)

Suspension of Judgment (1976)

Semantics and the Ambiguity of Proper Names (1976)

1.2 Reference

The Irrelevance of Intentions to Refer: Demonstratives and Demonstrations (2021)

Should Proper Names Still Seem So Problematic (2015)

Lest Auld Acquaintance be Forgot (2014)

Buenos Aires Symposium on Definite Descriptions: Responses (2009)

Buenos Aires Symposium on Rigidity: Responses (2009)

Referential Descriptions and Conversational Implicatures (2008)

Referential Descriptions: A Note on Bach (2008)

Reference Borrowing: A Response to Dunja Jutronić (2008)

Rigid Application (2005)

The Case for Referential Descriptions (2004)

Theories of Reference (2003)

Reference (1998)

On Determining Reference (1997)

Naturalistic Representation (1991)

Critical Notice of The Varieties of Reference by Gareth Evans (1985)

Donnellan’s Distinction (1981)

Brian Loar on Singular Terms (1980)

Singular Terms (1974)

1.3 Experimental Semantics

Two Sorts of Biological Kind Terms: The Cases of ‘Rice’ and ‘Rio de Janeiro Myrtle’ (with Brian Cross Porter) (Forthcoming)

Testing the Reference of Biological Kind Terms (with Brian Cross Porter) (2021)

The Reference of Proper Names: Testing Usage and Intuitions (with Nicolas Porot) (2018)

Testing Theories of Reference (2015)

Semantic Epistemology: Response to Machery (2012)

Whither Experimental Semantics? (2012)

Experimental Semantics (2011)

2. Philosophy of Linguistics

Linguistic Luck; A Response to Rey and Collins (November 2022)

Linguistic Intuitions: A Response to Gross and Rey (2020)

Linguistic Intuitions In Defense of Ordinarism (2014)

The Linguistic Conception of Grammars (2013)

Linguistic Intuitions are not “the Voice of Competence” (2013)

Linguistic Intuitions Revisited (2010)

What ‘Intuitions’ are Linguistic Evidence? (2010)

Psychological Conception, Psychological Reality (2009)

Explanation and Reality in Linguistics (2008)

A Response to Collins’ Note (2008)

Methodology in the Philosophy of Linguistics (2008)

Intuitions in Linguistics (2006)

Defending Ignorance of Language: Responses to the
Dubrovnik Papers (2006)

Linguistics is not Psychology (2003)

What’s Wrong with ‘the Right View’ (with Kim Sterelny) (1989)

3. Metaphysics

3.1 Realism

Ostrich Nominalism (forthcoming)

An Ignored Argument for Scientific Realism (2020)

Hilary and Me: Tracking Putnam on the Realism Debate (2012)

Are Unconceived Alternatives a Problem for Scientific Realism? (2012)

Realism/Anti-Realism (2008)

Scientific Realism (2005)

Worldmaking Made Hard (2004)

Moral Realism: A Naturalistic Perspective (2002)

Underdetermination and Realism (2002)

Incommensurability and the Priority of Metaphysics (2001)

Sustaining Actualism (2001)

A Naturalistic Defense of Realism (1999)

Putting Metaphysics First (1998)

Abberations of the Realism Debate (1991)

Realism without Representation: A Response to Appiah (1991)

Dummett’s Anti-Realism (1983)

“Ostrich Nominalism” or “Mirage Realism” (1980)

3.2 Truth

The Metaphysics of Deflationary Truth (2002)

Minimalist Truth (1991)

3.3 Mind

Methodology and the Nature of Knowing How (2011)

Transcending Transcendentalism: A Response to Boghossian (with Georges Rey) (1991)

Why Fodor Can’t Have it Both Ways (1991)

Transcendentalism about Content (1990)

3.4 Nonfactualism

The Metaphysics of Nonfactualism (1996) 

3.5 Biology

The Minimal Role of the Higher Categories in Biology (2023)

Defending Intrinsic Biological Essentialism (2021)

Individual Essentialism in Biology (2018)

Historical Biological Essentialism (2018)

Natural Kinds and Biological Realisms (2011)

Biological Realisms (2009)

Resurrecting Biological Essentialism (2008)

4. Epistemology

See also papers on intuitions under “2. Philosophy of Linguistics.”

Relying on Intuitions: Where Cappelen and Deutsch Go Wrong (2015)

We Don’t Learn About the World by Examining Concepts: A Response to Carrie Jenkins (2014)

The Role of Intuitions in the Philosophy of Language (2012)

Linguistic Knowledge (2011)

No Place for the A Priori (2011)

On Determining What There Isn’t (2009)

Intuitions (2006)

There is No A Priori (2005)

Reply to Bonjour (2005)

Naturalism and the A Priori (1998)

5. Sundry

Changing our Logic: A Quinean Perspective (with Jillian Rose Roberts) (2023)

Reflections on Naming and Necessity (2021)

Stirring the Possum: Responses to the Bianchi Papers (2020)

Responses to the Rijeka Papers (2006)


 

 

 

 

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